Designating The Muslim Brotherhood In Sudan As A Terrorist Organization

Implications and Consequences Amid the Confrontation with Iran
Policy Assessment by Zaelnoon Suliman – African Affairs Unit – Progress Center for Policies
Introduction
On 9 March 2026, the U.S. Department of State announced the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity, with Washington also intending to designate it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) starting 16 March. The U.S. administration justified the decision by citing allegations that individuals associated with the group were involved in acts of violence against civilians during the Sudanese war, in addition to claims that some fighters linked to the movement had received training and support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The decision comes amid a highly tense regional environment, coinciding with the escalating U.S.–Israeli confrontation with Iran, and the growing strategic importance of the Red Sea in international calculations—both in terms of maritime security and the broader regional and international competition for influence in the Horn of Africa.
Key Developments


• The U.S. Secretary of State announced the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as a terrorist organization, accusing individuals linked to the movement of receiving support from the IRGC and being involved in violence and mass executions against civilians during the Sudanese conflict.
• U.S. officials, according to international media reports, confirmed that the decision forms part of a broader policy in which Washington uses various available tools to combat terrorism and counter Iranian influence networks in the region.
• The U.S. administration also intends to designate the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) starting 16 March 2026.
• Previously, the United States designated the Al-Baraa bin Malik Battalion, linked to Sudanese Islamist currents, under Executive Order 14098 in September 2025, due to its involvement in the Sudanese war.
• The decision was taken under Section 219 of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act, in addition to Executive Order 13224, which concerns counterterrorism measures. Analysis Targeting Networks Some leaders within the Sudanese Islamic Movement believe that the U.S. decision does not directly target them. However, the wording of the designation and the entities referenced suggest, according to several observers, that it in fact targets the political and military networks associated with the Sudanese Islamic Movement, particularly the faction led by Ali Karti, as well as the political extensions linked to the National Congress Party, which ruled Sudan for three decades prior to the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime. The Islamic Movement came to power through a military coup in June 1989, carried out by army officers with support from its political leadership. The regime was later overthrown in 2019 following widespread popular protests. Some Sudan specialists argue that the outbreak of war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023 reopened space for Islamic Movement networks to attempt to regain influence within state institutions. Some experts place the U.S. decision within a broader framework of Washington’s policy toward Islamist movements suspected of maintaining links or communication channels with Iran. The decision also coincides with the intensifying U.S.–Israeli confrontation with Tehran, alongside emerging voices within certain Sudanese Islamist circles expressing political sympathy for Iran. According to diplomatic assessments, this has raised regional concerns about the possible emergence of new Iranian influence nodes on the western shore of the Red Sea. These concerns have been reinforced by reports over the past two years indicating military cooperation between Sudan and Iran, including the provision of military equipment and drones to the Sudanese army as part of its war against the RSF. Some observers also believe the U.S. decision may carry a political pressure message directed at the Sudanese military establishment, urging it to curb Islamist influence within the structures of power and to demonstrate greater flexibility toward political settlement initiatives sponsored by regional and international actors. The Nature of the U.S. Decision A closer reading of the decision indicates that it involves two distinct legal tracks: First: Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT)
This designation is issued under Executive Order 13224 and is typically implemented through the U.S. Treasury Department, particularly the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). It results in the freezing of assets within the United States, prohibition of financial transactions with the designated entities, and their inclusion in the U.S. sanctions regime. Second: Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)
This designation is issued under Section 219 of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act. It carries broader legal consequences, including criminalizing any form of material or logistical support for the organization, freezing its assets, banning its members from entering the United States, and enabling prosecution of individuals who provide support under U.S. law. Potential Implications
  • Politically, the decision may strengthen international narratives linking certain Islamist formations in Sudan to the continuation of the war, and may serve as a tool to pressure the Sudanese military to reduce Islamist influence within state institutions.
• Economically, the designation may further restrict financial networks associated with the Islamic Movement within the international financial system, especially given global banks’ reliance on compliance with U.S. sanctions regimes. This could deepen the financial isolation of these networks.
• Domestically, the decision is likely to make the question of Islamist participation in any future political transition more complicated, particularly if the FTO designation is formally implemented. This could trigger significant debate within Sudan’s political arena. At the same time, some researchers warn that such decisions could push certain Islamist factions toward adopting more confrontational rhetoric toward the West and potential peace initiatives, potentially intensifying political polarization within Sudan. Conclusion
    • The U.S. decision is not merely a legal measure; it carries political and strategic implications that may influence the balance of power within Sudan.
• The designation places the Sudanese military establishment before a complex dilemma: either limit Islamist influence within the structures of power or face growing international pressure.
• The move reflects a growing U.S. recognition of the strategic importance of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa within the broader regional confrontation with Iran.
• It also signals a U.S. effort to restrict political or military networks believed to constitute extensions of Iranian influence in Sudan and its regional environment.