By Zaelnoon Suliman – African Affairs Unit, Progress Center for Policies
Policy Assessment:
The Sudanese crisis is witnessing a notable shift in the level of regional and international engagement. A clearer and more assertive Gulf role has emerged in supporting a political trajectory aimed at ending the war, paralleled by unprecedented U.S. involvement following the American president’s announcement that he will personally oversee the Sudan file. This evolving landscape reflects the crystallization of a new approach—one that moves beyond the hesitancy that characterized international engagement over the past two years and elevates Sudan to a higher rank in the foreign policy priorities of Washington and Gulf capitals.
Current Context
The final communiqué of the 46th GCC Summit (Manama Summit 2025) expressed explicit political support for ending the war and establishing an independent civilian government. It also welcomed the U.S. initiative and the American president’s commitment to work with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and other partners to launch a process that ends the conflict and ensures lasting stability.
Concurrently, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that President Trump is personally managing the Sudan file without relying on envoys—an indication of a desire to bypass diplomatic bureaucracy and take more decisive action. African Union diplomatic sources indicate that Washington is preparing “critical” measures before the end of the year, based on a three-track roadmap: military, humanitarian, and political. Humanitarian track: focuses on opening safe corridors and ensuring aid flows under the supervision of a joint international committee.
Political track: aims to launch a civilian-led process—excluding Islamists and former regime elements—beginning with a ceasefire that paves the way to ending the war and implementing comprehensive military reform. These reforms include removing individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood from state security institutions, dismantling armed factions, and integrating them into a unified professional army. African Union sources also confirm ongoing regional–international coordination to prevent any external — military or political — support that could fuel the conflict.
Reading the Gulf–U.S. Engagement
The Gulf stance reflects a qualitative shift in its approach to the Sudanese crisis. The GCC has moved from cautious mediation to endorsing a clear political position supporting civilian transition—aligned with international views that see the continuation of the war as a threat to regional stability and to security in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
Direct U.S. presidential oversight marks a significant development that brings substantial political and diplomatic weight to mediation efforts. This involvement increases pressure on the warring parties and signals readiness to use punitive tools—freezing assets, expanding sanctions, and activating international accountability mechanisms—if the roadmap is rejected or obstructed.
The trilateral coordination between Washington, the GCC, and the African Union serves as a key pillar for stabilizing the conflict environment, particularly by curbing the reciprocal regional support that has enabled the fighting to persist and intensify. According to informed sources, the U.S. move also came in response to a Saudi request for Washington to assume a leading role and reinvigorate international efforts after the Jeddah track stalled—suggesting that regional calculations now view the cost of continuing the war as higher than the cost of intervention to end it.
Expected Position of the Sudanese Army and Sovereignty Council
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sovereignty Council appear to approach this coordinated engagement with pragmatic caution. From the military’s perspective, Gulf support—especially from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi—provides a protective buffer that prevents the imposition of a settlement that would diminish its role in the next transitional phase. This regional backing gives the army broader negotiating room in the face of international pressure for security-sector reform.
However, direct U.S. involvement presents serious challenges, as Washington ties ending the war to structural reforms within the military establishment—changes the current leadership may see as a threat to internal cohesion. The Sovereignty Council is therefore likely to seek more time by pushing for gradual security reforms while stressing that the unity and delicate internal balance of the army must not be compromised.
The army is also expected to oppose any arrangement granting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) political or military parity or any position enabling them to influence the military institution. If SAF perceives the international solution as imposed without addressing its concerns, it may resort to limited escalation to improve its negotiating position—without sliding into full confrontation that could undermine its regional support.
Expected Position of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
The RSF views the Gulf–U.S. initiative with deeper concern than its public statements suggest. The proposed roadmap—especially its security and institutional reforms—poses a direct threat to the RSF’s existence as an autonomous force and may lead to its integration into the national army and the dismantling of its military and economic networks.
Nevertheless, the RSF leadership may try to extract political advantage from renewed international interest by exhibiting tactical flexibility on ceasefires and humanitarian corridors to improve its global image and reduce the likelihood of sweeping sanctions. It may also seek alliances with selective civilian groups to secure indirect representation in post-war arrangements.
The loss or shift of external support—particularly from some Gulf capitals—presents a strategic challenge for the RSF. This may push it to attempt establishing new military facts on the ground before any settlement, such as quickly targeting remaining SAF garrisons in El-Obeid and Kadugli, or entering negotiations with conditions ensuring retention of at least a minimum level of force. If the leadership perceives that the international settlement aims to dismantle it entirely, it may adopt delaying tactics or calculated escalation—while avoiding red lines that could trigger direct international retaliation.
Conclusions
Gulf states are moving toward a clearer political stance supporting civilian transition and opposing continuation of the war, aligning with U.S. and international positions. Direct U.S. presidential management of the Sudan file constitutes a major shift, increasing pressure on the warring parties and giving political efforts unprecedented momentum.
The Sudanese army sees this coordinated approach as an opportunity to protect its institutional position, though it faces significant pressure regarding security-sector reform and limiting RSF gains.
The RSF views the international roadmap as a serious threat but may adopt tactical flexibility to secure limited influence in future arrangements.
Regional–international coordination is increasing to prevent external military or political support for any warring party, reducing their ability to sustain the conflict and pushing them toward negotiation.
Overall, the Sudanese crisis is entering a new phase of international management. The conflict is shifting from an open-ended internal confrontation to a file overseen by regional and global powers whose interests now converge on a shared objective: ending the war, steering Sudan toward a supervised civilian transition, and restructuring the military landscape to prevent a renewed outbreak of conflict in the future.
