Sudan’s War and the Islamist Grip: Four in Five Army Officers and 100% of Security Officers Are Islamists
Report: SPT
As Sudan continues its bloody conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, Islamist militias have returned to the forefront, emerging as one of the key players on the battlefield. In just two years of conflict, these groups have reorganized under new names and built a formidable military force that could potentially overwhelm the army itself if the war continues for several more years.
Islamists and the Spark of War:
According to multiple sources who spoke to us, the Islamists began planning for war in the first week of December 2022, during the period of the Framework Agreement meetings aimed at restoring the democratic transition. These meetings brought together political and civil forces under the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition and the military component, represented by the army and the Rapid Support Forces. Sources indicated that the Islamists then began plotting to block any agreement that could restore the democratic process.
An Islamist security source, who was part of the student security apparatus of the Islamic movement and served in various of its intelligence bodies, told SPT on condition of anonymity:
“Promotion of a plan to prevent the signing of the Framework Agreement between the army and the Forces of Freedom and Change began in early December 2022, within the Islamic movement’s cadres, in the form of incitement campaigns targeting individuals with slogans against democracy, secularism, and the ‘infidel West.’”
He added: “The war plan was discussed at the level of the Islamic movement’s leadership, in meetings with senior army officials, including Lieutenant General Shams al-Din Kabashi, Lieutenant General Yasser al-Atta, Brigadier Abbas Hassan al-Darouti, and Brigadier Hassan al-Balal from military intelligence.”
The source continued: “After the leadership of the Islamic movement and army commanders agreed on military action, security and military cadres within the movement were briefed on the war plan in early April 2023. From April 9 to 13, I attended, along with other Islamic security cadres, a briefing on the military plan at a residence in East Nile locality, Khartoum Bahri. The briefing covered full preparations for the battle.”
He also said: “ All student security cadres, mujahideen, and security apparatuses affiliated with the Islamic movement were mobilized. The briefings were conducted in various locations across Khartoum by prominent movement leaders, including Al-Hajj Adam, Anas Omar, Al-Naji Abdullah, Mohamed Ali Al-Jazouli, Naji Mustafa, and others.”
He concluded: “ Zero hour for the military operation was set for the morning of Saturday, April 15, 2023, but I left Khartoum on Friday, one day before the outbreak of war, heading to the city of Rabak for a supposed urgent family matter.”
Regarding his absence from the battle, he explained: “ I was not convinced of the operation’s success; I considered it a reckless move… and time has proven my concerns to be valid.”
Islamists Within Military Units:
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Another source, still serving within Islamist battalions in Omdurman, told SPT that their account largely aligned with the first source, confirming that Islamists began embedding their personnel within army units in early April, just days before the outbreak of war.
The source explained that Islamic security and military cadres were deployed across army units including: the Engineering Corps, Armored Corps, Signals Corps, the First Brigade in Al-Baqir south of Khartoum, and the Central Reserve Headquarters.
On how civilian cadres were integrated into military units, the source said:
“At least 75% of army officers – I mean officers, not soldiers – are affiliated with the Islamic movement. They were recruited into military and security colleges during the Islamist rule under former President Omar al-Bashir over the past thirty years, and they were responsible for embedding Islamic cadres within army units.”
When asked about the numbers, he laughed: “ What if I told you that 100% of security and intelligence officers belong to the Islamic movement؟”
A young engineer who participated in the war from the outset in the ranks of the Islamic movement, who asked to be referred to as “Abu Ahmed,” said that all Islamic movement members in civil service, professional sectors, banks, government companies, and other institutions joined the army and participated in various missions. Retired security and military officers were also reinstated, notably Brigadier General Nasr al-Din Abdel Fattah, now commander of the Armored Corps, who was recently seen meeting with Lieutenant General Burhan, army chief, at his latest meeting with the General Staff.
Abu Ahmed added: “ Regarding Brigadier General Nasr al-Din Abdel Fattah, he returned from retirement as a volunteer within the Islamist ranks. After the killing of Armored Corps commander Brigadier General Ayoub Abdel Qader in October 2023, he assumed command of the Armored Corps by order of the Islamic movement, which controls the unit, and he remains its commander to this day.”
The source noted that most Islamic cadres were killed in the Armored Corps, especially security officers, retired military personnel, and government employees affiliated with security bodies, including the director of Omdurman National Bank, Mohamed Mahjoub Waqi’ Allah, and Brigadier General retired Omar Al-Noman, who were killed in September 2024.
Brigadier General retired Bahr Ahmed Bahr, who returned from retirement to fight with the army, took command of operations in Khartoum Bahri but was killed in a military plane crash over Omdurman in February 2025.
Just two days before his death, Air Force Brigadier Abu Al-Qasim Ali was killed when Rapid Support Forces shot down his fighter jet in Nyala. Like his colleagues Nasr al-Din and Bahr, he had returned from retirement to fight under orders from the Islamic movement.
Al-Baraa ibn Malik Corps
The Al-Baraa ibn Malik Corps is considered one of the most significant and well-known Islamist militias. It is led by Al-Misbah Abu Zaid Talha, a young Islamist commander. According to informed sources within the Islamist movement who spoke to the outlet, the corps is overseen by senior Islamist figures including Ali Karti and Osama Abdallah, with the support of several aides, while from the army’s side, General Yasser al-Atta plays a supervisory role.
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Sources said that leadership within the corps is divided in loyalty between two rival factions vying for control of the Islamist movement. However, a larger majority leans toward the Ali Osman faction led by Ali Karti and Ahmed Haroun, at the expense of the Nafie Ali Nafie faction led by Ibrahim Mahmoud and Ibrahim Ghandour.
One source explained that while the two groups remain at odds over leadership, they are united in fighting alongside the army and in their hostility toward democratic civilian political forces.
The sources stressed that Al-Baraa ibn Malik Corps is the most advanced in terms of training, weaponry, and financial backing. Its fighters have received military training inside Sudan from foreign experts—including Ukrainians, Iranians, and Turks—while some are dispatched to Iran for further intensive training on specialized weapons and drone warfare. These drones, sources said, are supplied by both Iran and Turkey.
According to insiders, Al-Baraa is the only Islamist force currently in possession of drones.
An Islamist source revealed that the corps headquarters is located in a building adjacent to the Karari locality offices in Omdurman. The building, reportedly owned by an Islamist leader, serves both as offices and residence for some commanders.
Among its senior leadership, besides Al-Misbah Talha, are Muhannad Fadl and Owais Ghanem. A fourth commander, Hisham Bairam, was killed on July 13 during the battle of Umm Sumaymah in Kordofan.
Special Operations Battalion
The Special Operations Battalion is primarily composed of former members of the Islamist movement’s “Popular Security” apparatus. Sources noted that the battalion originally formed along ethnic lines—Islamists from Kordofan and Darfur—as a counterweight to northern dominance within Al-Baraa.
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This ethnic tension has long plagued Islamist structures, dominated historically by elites from the Nile Valley, though it rarely surfaced publicly.
The battalion was first organized in Omdurman but lacked a clear command structure, functioning mainly as a loose group of fighters from Islamist security agencies, particularly student security units, who rallied to fight alongside the army.
After the army regained control of Jabal Moya in Sennar State, central Sudan, command of the battalion was handed to Shihab Burj, a veteran fighter from the so-called “Mujahideen.” Burj had previously been held as a prisoner of war by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in the Nuba Mountains between 2013 and 2017 before being released in a humanitarian exchange.
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The formal establishment of the battalion followed separate meetings between Burj, Ahmed Mohammed Abu Bakr (known as “the Bat”), and Farhat al-Umda with Deputy Army Commander General Shams al-Din Kabashi in Port Sudan, two weeks after the army retook Jabal Moya. Shortly afterward, the trio traveled to Atbara, northern Sudan, where they met with Ali Karti and Ahmed Haroun, who endorsed Burj’s appointment as commander.
Notable leaders of the battalion, alongside Burj and his deputy Farhat al-Umda, included Ahmed “the Bat,” Anas Mohammed Fadl, and Mu’tasim “Batman.” All three were killed in late July during clashes with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Umm Siyala, Kordofan.
Another founding leader, Yusuf Mohammed Zain, is reportedly being held captive by the RSF since October 3, 2024, following battles in Jabal Moya, Sennar State.
According to sources, the Special Operations Battalion is less well-trained than the Al-Baraa Corps. Its advanced weaponry and drones are supplied by Ahmed Haroun, the wanted former head of the National Congress Party, indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Logistical and financial support, however, comes largely from the budget of White Nile State and governors in areas where the battalion operates.
Instructions and directives to the battalion’s fighters reportedly come directly from Haroun, who personally oversees and sponsors the force, while coordination with army intelligence takes place in certain operations. The battalion is also said to maintain operational ties with the Sudan Shield Forces led by Abu Aqla Kikl.
The Four Battalions and the Elite Brigades
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Other Islamist formations include the battalions known as Al-Bunyan al-Marsous, Al-Barq al-Khatif, and Usud al-Areen. Their fighters are drawn largely from former “Mujahideen” and veterans of the Popular Defense Forces under the al-Bashir regime. These battalions are led by long-serving Islamist commanders such as Al-Naji Abdallah and Al-Naji Mustafa, and remain under the supervision of Ali Karti, according to sources.
Meanwhile, the two “Elite Brigades” are composed mainly of former security and operations officers, mobilized volunteers, members of the Popular Resistance, and Central Reserve Police (known locally as Abu Tira). They are commanded by former intelligence officers.
One of their most prominent leaders, Brig. Gen. Ihab Mohammed Yousif al-Tayyib, was killed in May during fierce clashes with RSF forces in the al-Khuwei area of West Kordofan.
Conclusion
These developments highlight the growing footprint of Islamist militias in Sudan’s war, marked by their expanding structures, diversified leadership, and foreign ties. While divided internally by rivalries and factional disputes, they converge on a common objective: fighting alongside the army and opposing democratic civilian forces.
If left unchecked, these militias risk consuming what remains of the Sudanese army, potentially threatening not only Sudanese freedoms and the future of democracy, but also the stability of the wider region.
