Three Messages to President Trump Before the Washington Quad Meeting on Sudan
By Mohamed Elshabik
As the Sudan Quad, comprising the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt prepares to meet in Washington on July 30, 2025, the Sudanese people watch with cautious hope and deep apprehension. The summit marks the first major diplomatic initiative under the new US administration aimed at stopping the devastating war that erupted on April 15, 2023 between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This effort comes after a year of diplomatic paralysis. The Geneva platform hosted by the previous US administration on August 14, 2024 failed to produce any progress. It was preceded by multiple rounds of talks in Jeddah, including the Jeddah Declaration of May 2023, as well as the Manama Agreement of January 2024, and in London on the occasion of the second anniversary of the war in April 2025. Each of these initiatives faltered due to a lack of genuine commitment and willingness to end the fighting and because they systematically excluded broader Sudanese civilian participation.
As these initiatives have faltered, millions of people across Sudan, have suffered one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Whether in conflict zones or areas spared the worst violence, many now live without water, electricity, health care, or basic security. Markets have collapsed. Schools remain closed, and 14 million children are out of school. According to credible humanitarian sources, over 30.4 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. Famine conditions are looming, and 24.6 million people are facing acute food insecurity. More than 150,000 people are believed to have died since the war began. Sudan’s healthcare infrastructure has collapsed. Displacement continues at scale, with nearly 10 million people have been displaced. People queue for water, struggle to feed their families, shelter the displaced, and yearn for normalcy. Their silence is not indifference; it is the result of exhaustion and repression. The seriousness of this renewed U.S. engagement, and the upcoming Washington meeting, presents a pivotal opportunity to chart a different course – one for which the Sudanese people are urgently waiting. But to do so, three urgent messages must guide the approach. War in Khartoum, social media 1. Spoilers are nervous and that’s a sign of progress Even before the Washington meeting convenes, figures from the former regime and war economy profiteers have begun attacking the process. These actors, many of whom served in the now-defunct National Congress Party or held senior security positions, have thrived in a fragmented Sudan, where state institutions are weak and conflict is protracted. For them, peace represents an existential threat. Just two days ago, one such high-profile figure – Ahmed Haroun – a former regime leader, who fled prison following the outbreak of war, and is wanted by the International Criminal Court, publicly reemerged to send threatening signals, warning SAF leaders against compromise. This is not a new tactic. These spoilers have undermined every major effort to stop the war since it began. They opposed the Jeddah Declaration, which could have ended the conflict within weeks. They obstructed the Manama initiative in January 2024 and publicly warned against participation in the Geneva platform in August of the same year. Their strategy is clear: to perpetuate the war to preserve their influence and access to illicit resources. They excel at generating disinformation, mobilizing fear, and manipulating regional dynamics. But their volume should not be mistaken for legitimacy, the majority of Sudanese are desperate for peace and it is their voice that should be prioritized. 2. Humanitarian access must be operationalized Despite Sudan’s overwhelming need, humanitarian access remains obstructed. Aid convoys are routinely looted or denied passage. Humanitarian workers are harassed, and critical areas particularly Darfur and parts of Kordofan are effectively cut off from relief. This is not a logistical crisis, it is a political one. Both warring parties have turned access into a bargaining tool, in direct violation of international humanitarian law. The commitments made under the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect Civilians, signed on May 11, 2023, have seen minimal implementation. This must change. Humanitarian aid cannot be made conditional upon ceasefire agreements or political milestones. It must be treated as an urgent priority. The US administration should consider applying a version of the Danforth test used in the early 2000s by US Special Envoy John Danforth, in which access to humanitarian corridors was used as a confidence-building measure to test the parties’ seriousness. We recommend designating North Darfur and the Nuba Mountains as pilot zones. These areas are in dire need, and contested control over them provides a realistic opportunity to verify each party’s commitment to facilitating aid. A credible outcome from the upcoming effort must include: • A UN-mandated framework for crossline and cross-border humanitarian operations. • A system of neutral and monitored humanitarian corridors. • A mechanism for independent verification and consequences for obstruction or non-compliance. As emphasized in the World Economic Forum’s 2024 Geneva talks analysis: “There is no shortage of normative guidance on humanitarian access. The challenge lies in enforcement, coordination, and political will.” If the Quad’s new process is to yield meaningful progress, it must treat humanitarian access not as an afterthought, but as a central pillar of peace, accountability, and protection. 3. Deliver a peace deal that lasts Sudan’s history is marked by failed peace agreements. From the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to Darfur-specific deals in Abuja, Doha, and Juba, the pattern has remained consistent: short-term, elite-driven bargains that excluded the broader public and failed to address the underlying causes of conflict. But something changed in December 2018. A civilian-led revolution spread across Sudan. It was not a coup or an armed rebellion, it was a peaceful, mass democratic movement. For the third time in Sudanese history, citizens, led primarily by youth and women, demanded an end to authoritarian rule, militarized governance, and institutional inequality. This time, the revolution ended a 30-year dictatorship and gave rise to a civilian-led transitional government. But it was dismantled in October 2021, when the two generals now at war staged a coup. What followed was the descent into today’s catastrophic conflict. The Quad meeting, and any follow-up broader peace effort, must not replicate the mistakes of the past. The political peace process must be Sudanese-owned and must meaningfully include civilian voices, not as symbolic participants but as principal stakeholders. If the United States and its partners continue to engage exclusively with armed actors, they will only reinforce the very dynamics that sparked this war. This is a chance to build a new model—one that prioritizes legitimacy over expediency, inclusion over powersharing, and justice over quiet deals. The Sudanese people remember former Republican President George W. Bush for brokering the CPA that ended Sudan’s second civil war. But they also remember that the CPA, while successful in securing peace, neglected the democratic transition within Sudan itself, which led to the separation of South Sudan, and entrenched one of the most autocratic regimes in the country’s history for an additional 14 years (2005– 2019). The Noah principle goes: “No more prizes for predicting the rain, prizes only for building the arks.” George W. Bush built the ship, but the real prize is not the ship, it’s the shore. Let history remember you as the leader who helped Sudan’s democratic transition finally reach its shore. The Sudanese Revolution, photo by author
Mohamed Elshabik is a political and civil society pro-democracy activist and served as Undersecretary of the Ministry of Labor and Social Development in Sudan’s first transitional government (2019–2021).
