Washington and Sudan: From Ending the War to Managing the Catastrophe

Policy Assessment by Zaelnoon Suliman, African Affairs Unit, Progress Center for Policies
Introduction
The remarks made by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio before Congress laid bare the depth of the crisis Washington faces in dealing with the Sudanese conflict. Describing the situation as “frustrating,” Rubio offered an implicit acknowledgement of the limits of American leverage over a war whose trajectory has become entangled in conflicting regional interests that exceed the tools of pressure and influence Washington has at its disposal.
At a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the State Department’s budget request for fiscal year 2027, Rubio stated: “The divisions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia have really complicated our ability to end this conflict.” He added that Sudan “has unfortunately become a proxy war between several countries.” He explained that the current focus of the American administration is on identifying two cities for each party — four in total — to serve as humanitarian aid distribution hubs. He then remarked: “What is really frustrating about Sudan is that one of the parties agrees to something and then doesn’t follow through.”
Analysis
From a Diplomacy of Resolution to an Admission of Impotence
Secretary Rubio’s description of the situation in Sudan as “frustrating” is no passing diplomatic expression; it is an implicit acknowledgement that Washington has lost its capacity to meaningfully influence the course of this crisis. The regional powers waging a proxy war on Sudanese soil are now operating with an autonomy that exceeds whatever tools Washington possesses to constrain or direct them.
More telling still is that Rubio took the rare step of explicitly naming the UAE–Saudi split before Congress — at a time when Washington typically avoids public disclosure of disagreements between its Gulf allies, for fear of undermining the cohesion of the regional architecture it sponsors. This departure from convention admits of two interpretations that are not mutually exclusive: either the rift has grown so deep that it can no longer be concealed or diplomatically deflected, or Washington is seeking to distribute responsibility by pointing to factors beyond its control. Both possibilities reveal weakness in the American position on Sudan, not strength.
The Dimensions of the UAE–Saudi Split in Sudan
By Washington’s own assessment, the dispute between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has moved beyond a competition for influence and become a direct confrontation played out on Sudanese soil, with the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces as its respective proxies. Reports indicate that tensions between the two Gulf powers have spilled beyond Sudan into Yemen, where Saudi Arabia struck a UAE weapons shipment in December 2025 that was en route to the Abu Dhabi-backed Southern Transitional Council. This escalation is widely seen as a reflection of two divergent visions of the regional order: a Saudi vision grounded in the stability of state institutions, driven by priorities tied to its own regional security, the protection of maritime corridors, and economic stability; and an Emirati vision that regards the nation-state as suffering from structural crises owing to the grip of political Islam movements that threaten its regional interests — impelling it to back proxy groups as instruments for reshaping political balances.
An Absence of New Pressure Mechanisms
Rubio’s remarks contained no reference to sanctions against states supporting the warring parties, and no new pressure mechanism of any kind — a glaring contradiction with legislative proposals already before Congress, such as the U.S. Engagement in Sudanese Peace Act introduced by Representative Gregory Meeks. That bill calls for sanctions against the leadership of both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF, an expanded arms embargo, and the appointment of a dedicated U.S. special envoy for Sudan. As yet, there are no indications that the current administration intends to adopt any of these recommendations — which means that American policy toward Sudan is caught in a vicious cycle: acknowledging failure without any willingness to change the rules of the game.
The Freeze on American Aid: A Devastating Blow to Humanitarian Work
In a development that compounded an already dire situation, President Trump’s decision on 20 January 2025 to freeze foreign assistance resulted in the closure of vital humanitarian programmes in Sudan. According to research reports, 742 communal kitchens in Khartoum — serving approximately 816,000 people — were shut down, gravely threatening the capacity of local Emergency Response Rooms to deliver life-saving services. This blow came at a time when the United States was Sudan’s largest humanitarian donor, having contributed more than $2.3 billion since the start of fiscal year 2023. The freeze now leaves millions of Sudanese without support, and illustrates how shifts in American domestic policy can have an immediate and catastrophic impact on the ground.
Conclusions
The Secretary of State’s remarks reflect a growing American focus on the humanitarian track — identifying cities for aid distribution — rather than the political track, signalling a shift in priorities from seeking to end the conflict to merely managing its humanitarian consequences. This amounts to an implicit admission that a political settlement is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in the foreseeable future — meaning, in practical terms, that the war will continue, and that American policy will continue to address its symptoms rather than its causes.
Rubio’s acknowledgement that the heart of the crisis lies in the transformation of the Sudanese conflict into an arena of regional rivalry — above all between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, prosecuted through local proxies on the ground — renders the future of the war hostage to regional dynamics rather than American will. With no special envoy in place and aid frozen, Washington has made clear that Sudan is no longer a priority; it has become, instead, a bargaining chip in larger contests with its own allies.