Sudanese Voices
In a polished and concise presentation, journalist Khalid Osman introduced media figure Mohamed Latif to speak on issues of transitional justice via the “Clubhouse” platform, in an event organized by the Political Club Family – Australia, on Friday, May 22. The session took place amid extensive discussions on Sudan’s transitional experience and the complexities of dismantling the single-party state.
Latif began by greeting the Sudanese people, praising the “Sumoud Alliance” for standing firm in the face of war and collapse. He also paid tribute to the civilian leadership meeting in Nairobi, describing it as a new spark of hope for re-coordinating civilian forces and paving the way toward a comprehensive political solution to the Sudanese crisis.
He recalled his memory in the
1990s, focusing on the IGAD initiative launched in 1994, which the Inqaz government(the Brotherhood government) rejected. Later, he noted, the Egyptian–Libyan initiative emerged, which he believed aimed to derail the serious IGAD process. He said that since that time he had written about the necessity of dismantling the party-state in favor of a state for all citizens, stressing that the core of Sudan’s crisis lies in the monopolization of power and the exclusion of other Sudanese from governing their own state.
Latif stated that the Dismantling Empowerment Committee successfully exposed the deep structure of empowerment within state institutions and revealed the networks of corruption and vested interests built by the former regime over decades. However, he added that it failed to establish a sustainable institutional project that would ensure the continuation of dismantling and reform.
He explained that the committee achieved significant breakthroughs in dismantling regime networks and recovering part of public funds and assets, but the experience did not evolve into a comprehensive legal and institutional reform project capable of withstanding political shifts.
He noted that the absence of genuine institutional construction made the experience vulnerable to rapid collapse following the October 25, 2021 coup, as former regime networks regained influence within state institutions and large parts of the empowerment system were restored.
Latif emphasized that this setback does not mean the idea of dismantling empowerment was wrong; rather, it reveals the weakness of the legal and organizational framework that managed the transitional period, and the inability to transform dismantling from a temporary political measure into a permanent state project beyond individuals and political circumstances.
Othman Al-Tayeb Youssef (Secretary-General of the Dismantling Empowerment Committee)
Othman Al-Tayeb Youssef presented an analysis of the experience of the Dismantling Empowerment Committee, stating that it was a necessary and courageous experiment in its historical context, as it helped expose and dismantle a significant portion of the empowerment structure within the state. However, he also described it as an incomplete experience in terms of institutional design and sustainability.
He noted that the core issue was not the idea of dismantling itself but the lack of institutional, legal, and administrative development needed to ensure continuity and transform the initiative into a permanent state project. The main challenge, he argued, was the absence of a durable institutional framework capable of protecting the outcomes of dismantling from political reversal.
He explained that the committee operated through three main tasks: dismantling the former regime’s structure, recovering public funds and assets, and combating corruption within state institutions. The process, he added, went through multiple review stages starting from subcommittees, then the secretariat and specialized committees, and finally, the higher committee for final decisions, with opportunities for review and appeal.
He added that key challenges included the difficulty of finding fully neutral personnel, the vast and complex nature of the files, and the influence of personal biases in some processes. He also pointed out that the legal status of the committee, as defined in the constitutional document, did not allow for institutional permanence, which affected staff stability.
He further clarified that the committee had limited powers such as arrest and detention in necessary cases related to protecting state institutions and preventing sabotage or asset smuggling, but these powers were exercised under strict legal procedures.
Regarding the judiciary and public prosecution, he stated that although their representatives participated in the committee, these institutions themselves required reform, making the existence of a revolutionary committee a necessity imposed by the transitional circumstances.
Dr. Al-Fatih Omar provided a critical reading of the Dismantling Empowerment Committee’s experience, arguing that the main problem was not only implementat n, but the institutional and legal structure upon which the experiment was built.
He questioned whether the committee had succeeded in defining itself to the public as a reformist and judicial institution, or whether it remained, in many people’s perception, a political body shaped by polarization during the transitional period. This, he argued, weakened its ability to build broad societal trust.
He emphasized that true success should not be measured only by removing individuals, but by the ability to dismantle the “structure of empowerment” itself, including its deeply rooted political, economic, and social networks within both the state and society, and to transform this into a permanent institutional reform process independent of individuals and political conditions.
In conclusion, participants agreed that the dismantling empowerment experience was necessary and courageous in exposing the deep state and corruption, but it remained institutionally incomplete and did not evolve into a lasting reform project capable of preventing the reproduction of the old regime.
The key question remained open: How can dismantling empowerment be transformed from a temporary political battle into a sustainable national project that rebuilds the Sudanese state on solid legal foundations?
