3/4/2023 5:29:35 AM
The Framework Agreement and Mbeki's
Roadmap:The Same Approach and Characteristics!
By El-Wathig Kameir
In view of my extensive following of the ongoing political process, and while reviewing old
records relating to the Sudanese political scene, it has become clear to me that, despite
evolving circumstances and changing conditions, military cliques and political elites have
continued to replicate the same approaches to resolving the issue of developing an inclusive
national dialogue and its accompanying constitutional process, both necessary for laying the
foundations of building the Sudanese citizenship state. In this context, I maintain in the current
article that, although the nature of the political regime may have differed, and political players
might have adopted varied positions (though they themselves have not changed), the approach
followed by the Forces of Freedom and Change -Central Council (FFC-CC), together with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces
(RSF), to reach the Framework Agreement, December 5, 2022) is identical to the approach
adopted by the Ingaz regime in its later years to sign the "Roadmap" of the High-level African
Implementation Panel Mechanism, chaired by former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa.
This had the aim of accommodating opposition political forces in the "national dialogue" called
for by the head of the regime in January 2014. Despite its regional and international support,
however, Mbeki's Roadmap remained a mere sketch until the outbreak of the December 2018
revolution. The roadmap did not result in any form of political settlement allowing the country
to move from one-party rule to a pluralistic democratic system. Against this backdrop, the article
will try to answer the following question: What is the likely fate of the Framework Agreement?
Comparing Mbeki's Roadmap and the
Framework Agreement: Approach and
Results!
The Ingaz regime rested on increasingly shaky and turbulent grounds following the secession
of South Sudan, and the subsequent outbreak of protests against the backdrop of the
worsening economic situation in June 2012, and the popular uprising in September 2013. All
these developments worked to create a new political reality. Political opposition to, and the
escalation of military action against, the regime had expanded, while the struggle for positions
of power within the ranks of the National Congress Party, the ruling party, reached its peak in
state institutions, even including the armed forces and security agencies.
These
circumstances, alongside an international blockade and regional pressures, forced the
deposed President, Omer Al-Bashir, to launch the initiative of the National Dialogue, framed
as "AlWathba", on January 27, 2014, to break his isolation, locally and externally, which was
loosening his grip on power. The call for dialogue was welcomed by the international
community, represented through the countries of the Troika (United States, United Kingdom
and Norway), the European Union and the regional community (represented by the African
Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC)). Nevertheless, the tug of war between the
government and the opposition hampered the process of dialogue, prompting the regional and
international communities to intervene through the mediation of the "AU High-level
Implementation Panel", chaired by President Thabo Mbeki, in accordance with AUPSC
Resolution No. 456 of September 14, 2014, for the purpose of drawing up a roadmap to bring
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all the Sudanese political forces together around the negotiating table in order to conclude and
develop a comprehensive political settlement.
The Ingaz regime's approach to the issue of dialogue was based on two concurrent
assumptions, first: the government was only ready to negotiate with the armed movements and
those whom it recognized from among the opposition parties. Secondly, the only option for the
rest of the opposition forces was to join the political process, through engaging in dialogue with
the 7 + 7 Mechanism (7 representatives of the National Congress and 7 representatives of the
opposition parties who agreed to participate). The government was not to sit with these forces
as "blocs" (Sudan Call and National Consensus Forces, at that time). The African Mechanism
did not disappoint the government, which in turn signed the "roadmap" proposed by President
Thabo Mbeki in March 2016, and which was subsequently signed by the designated four
opposition organizations, namely, the Sudan People's Liberation Army- North, the Sudan
Liberation Movement/Minawi, the Justice and Equality Movement/Dr. Jibril, and the National
Umma Party/Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, in August 2015.
The roadmap identified its parties as the government of the National Congress wished and
focused them around the government initiated process in two ways, 1) a meeting in Addis
Ababa, between the 7 + 7 mechanism and the four signatories to the roadmap, to look into the
necessary steps necessary for realizing the inclusivity of the national dialogue, 2) the
agreement of these forces to endorse the Sudanese national dialogue initiated by the president
at a time when opposition forces were calling for a (national constitutional) dialogue that would
end one-party rule, and trigger a constitutional process addressing the issues of peace and
national unity, the economy, fundamental rights and freedoms, national identity and
governance.
The diligent and sincere endeavors of Sayed Al-Saddiq Al-Mahdi failed to persuade Thabo
Mbeki; his sponsor, the AU PSC; or the NCP government, to open the door to accommodating
the rest of the opposition forces in the "preparatory meeting," which was scheduled to precede
their participation in the national dialogue process.
The National Dialogue Conference
concluded its meetings and issued its final statement on October 9, 2016, without the
participation of these political forces. Two years later, the final curtain was drawn down on the
roadmap following the preparatory meeting called for by Mbeki in Addis Ababa on 9 December
2018. The Vice-President of the National Congress Party Faisal Hassan adamantly objected
to the participation in the meeting of opposition party representatives, insisting that he would
only meet with the four roadmap signatories. On December 19, the preparatory meeting
collapsed and the opposition delegations returned to Khartoum, headed by Al-Imam Al-Mahdi,
concurrently with the ignition of the spark of the December revolution, and rising popular
resistance until the regime’s fall on April 11, 2019.
In order to manage the process of transition and democratic transformation following the
previous regime’s downfall, the signatories to the "Declaration of Freedom and Change" (FFC)
signed the Constitutional Document, premised on a "partnership" between these forces and
the Transitional Military Council (Army and Rapid Support Forces). Thus, the first transitional
government was formed under the Premiership of Dr. Abdallah Hamdok. The aspirations of
democratization were not realized, as the FFCs soon became divided, and discord escalated
between them and the armed movements, on the one hand, and between the Forces of
Freedom and Change – Central Council (FFC-CC) and the military leadership, on the other,
while conflicts within the military component also started to surface. These factors, coupled
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with the fact that General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (the military component) was approaching
the end of his term, and was urged by the FFCs to hand over the presidency of the Sovereign
Council to them (the civilian component), together prompted the military component to carry
out the coup d’etat dissolving the "partnership" on October 25, 2021, and the prime minister to
resign in early January 2022.
Following the failure of the agreement signed between the army Commander-in-Chief and the
resigned Prime Minister, the FFC’s position shifted from demanding the reinstatement of the
"partnership", on condition of removing the current military leadership, to declaring the rejection
of this "partnership", and boycotting any engagement with the military component whatsoever.
When these forces did not participate in the political process preparatory meeting called for by
the "Trilateral Mechanism" in April 2022, US Assistant Secretary of State, Molly Phee during
her visit to the Sudan in June 2022, intervened to attempt to unravel this political impasse. The
vision of Molly Phee paved the way for the formation of the Quartet (United States of America,
United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia), which successfully brought the
FFCs-CC together with the military component. The FFC-CC initiated the political process by
introducing the draft constitution which had been prepared by the Steering Committee of the
Sudanese Bar Association (SCSBA). The continued exchange of memoranda between the
parties, with the support of the Quartet and the Tripartite Mechanism, resulted in a Framework
Agreement aimed at ending the political situation precipitated by the "coup" and restoring the
process of the democratic civil transition, signed in December 2022.
Notwithstanding the change of the political architecture and the alteration in the positions of
the political players (though many have remained the same), the 2022 Framework Agreement
has drawn much from Mbeki's 2016 roadmap, in terms of approach, features and
accompanying circumstances. At the outset, the Sudanese people were not happy with Mbeki's
roadmap, and were equally unexcited about the Framework Agreement. In both cases, the
president of the defunct regime's call for a "national" dialogue found some support from the
ruling party's followers and allies but faced defiance from the political and social opposition
forces. Likewise, political forces, even within the FFC coalition, were divided as to the feasibility
of the Framework Agreement between advocates and adversaries. Mbeki's roadmap identified
by name only four organizations with whom the government and its ruling party would sit down
and negotiate. Thus, the only option for dissenting political forces was to engage in the
sessions of the national dialogue to express their views. In the same vein, the Framework
Agreement classified participants in the political process as revolutionary forces, armed
struggle movements and transition forces, while defining the signatories' functions in shaping
transitional institutions. Political forces who are not signatories to the agreement are afforded
the opportunity to participate in the designated workshops to decide on the five main issues to
be integrated into the final agreement, and all political and societal forces have the right to
participate in the prospective "constitutional congress".
In the Mbeki process, the National Congress government refused to engage with, or recognize
opposition political "blocs" or "alliances", especially the National Consensus Forces and Sudan
Call, with the exception of the four signatories to the roadmap. Similarly, the FFC-CC rejected
dialogue with forces opposed to the Framework Agreement as blocs or alliances (especially
the FFC- Democratic Bloc), and the parties signed the agreement on an individual basis,
together with other political and professional organizations, the Army Commander-in-Chief and
the Rapid Support Forces Commander. However, FFC-CC, as a "bloc", have nevertheless
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been leading and directing the process, which they triggered with workshop on the draft SCSBA
constitution. The FFC-CC holds the reigns of the signatory entities to the Framework
Agreement, in the same manner as the National Congress held the reigns of the national
dialogue process and pulled the strings of the party's loyalists and followers. With regards to
external support from the international community, Mbeki's Roadmap was supported by
Africa's regional organization, the African Union, and internationally by the Troika and the
European Union, as the Framework Agreement is being strongly backed by the Trilateral
Mechanism and the Quartet.
The Imperative of the Constitutional
Conference!
Notwithstanding the above-elaborated similarities, the greatest commonality of Mbeki's
Roadmap and the Framework Agreement lies in their preoccupation with issues of governance
and power sharing in transitional institutions, to almost a complete neglect (possibly intended)
of constitutional issues. In my opinion, Sudan and the Sudanese people are fed up, and remain
discontented with, if not indifferent to, agreements and charters signed between the respective
political factions to resolve governance and power sharing problems. This power struggle has
only led to more complications and hurdles, threatening the very existence of the state, rather
than addressing the fundamental and requisite constitutional issues needed for laying the
foundation of the Sudanese state. It is time to move forward from trying to address matters
relating to power i.e., "who rules or governs" in isolation from the issues of the constitution and
the prerequisites of building the state. If we take note of our past experience and are indeed
seriously seeking to stabilize the system of governance in the country, the focus should be on
"how” and “who” governs.
The inherent failure of all our transitional experiences since independence in 1956 to achieve
democratic transformation and sustain a pluralistic parliamentary system does not exempt the
current transition from this same fate if political dialogue on matters of government and power
sharing continues without debate and agreement on the constitutional foundations of the
Sudanese state. Therefore, the political and social forces must, and should, proceed in the
direction of convening of a Constitutional Conference to consider these fundamental questions,
thus setting the political scene for free and fair elections on the basis of a "permanent"
constitution. In an open letter to the former prime minister, before the formation of his first
government, and before the commencement of the Juba peace negotiations, I argued that "the
issues that will be brought to the peace negotiations table constitute the same agenda as the
constitutional conference. Is it not politically possible to combine the peace talks with the
constitutional conference in a single "peace and constitution commission”? This commission
could begin negotiating comprehensive security arrangements in parallel with the dialogue on
national constitutional issues.”1
1 El-Wathig Kameir, “To the Prime Minister: The Password for a Peaceful Transition!”
Sudanile.com, September 5, 2019.
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Of course, the Framework Agreement has not yet reached its logical conclusion, allowing us
to pass judgement as to whether it will encounter the same fate as Mbeki's Roadmap. The
agreement may disintegrate, or a government may be formed with a narrow political and social
base limited to the agreement’s signatories. Perhaps the most likely scenario would be to reach
a consensus to form a transitional government from a broader political and social base, which
includes FFFC-CC and, at least, the Democratic Bloc. Besides running the affairs of the
government on an interim basis, the main priority of this government, to which it should be held
politically and morally accountable, is the formation of the "national committee for drafting the
constitution", of scholars, legislators, opinion leaders and ordinary citizens, to prepare for the
convening of a national constitutional conference. All political and social forces (with the
exception of criminals or corrupt persons) should be allowed to participate in this conference
without exclusion, whether they are the Sudan People's Liberation Movement North/Al-Hilu,
the Sudan Liberation Movement/Abdul Wahid, the Communist Party, the youth resistance
committees, or other social components. A constitutional conference would be the country's
first step in the path towards stability, paving the way for the necessary enabling environment
for free and fair elections, on the basis of a constitution approved by the Sudanese people in
a referendum, whose objective should be to define the constitutional form of governance on
which these elections will be based. In my view, the refusal of a considerable number of political
entities to participate in the five thematic workshops prescribed by the Framework Agreement
is understandable in light of the unfolding political conflict, while it is difficult for the opposition
political forces, on one hand, and the advocates for "radical change", on the other, to reject the
call for participation in a constitutional conference. In a nutshell, whether a government is
formed by only the signatories to the Framework Agreement, or whether it has a wider base,
or even if the overall political process collapses, thus creating a new political situation and
power structure, a constitutional congress remains the only key to resolving the Sudanese
dilemma. Otherwise, the country will never come out of its endless tunnel of agreements and
political charters, triggering the vicious cycle again and taking the country back to square one.
Conclusion
Parliaments and elected constituent assemblies (1956-1986), which followed all previous
transitional periods, failed to accomplish their primary mandate: namely, drafting a permanent
constitution. Moreover, no political pact or agreement has been bereft of reference to the
significance of convening a constitutional conference. However, the Sudanese have historically
failed to sit together around a table for dialogue on the country's founding pillars, perhaps
except for the "Roundtable Conference" debating what was then known as the "southern
problem." Dr. John Garang called for a constitutional conference following the April 1985
popular uprising, it was incorporated into the Koka Dam Declaration in March 1986, and all
civilian political forces agreed in 1988 to end the civil war and reach a peace agreement through
a national constitutional conference, scheduled to be convened on September 18, 1989.
However, this was circumvented by the National Islamic Front’s military coup that toppled the
parliamentary democratic system and overthrew the elected government. In 1995, the call for
a constitutional congress was one of the most important resolutions of Asmara Conference on
Fundamental Issues (which itself was a mini conference). It was also an integral objective of
the 2019 Transitional Constitutional Document, and subsequently the 2022 Framework
Agreement. Paradoxically, the FFC-CC itself initiated the current political process with the draft
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constitution prepared by the SCSBA, on which basis on which the Framework Agreement was
inaugurated. I do not believe in deferring consensus on foundational issues and the constitution
to until after elections. It is not easy to predict how and when these elections will be organized,
particularly in light of the current country's political discord, polarization, and military
disharmony. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to realize a sustained democratic
transformation. Thus the fundamental question to be raised is the following:
For how long will the necessity of convening a constitutional congress be evaded?